Memory
theoretical propositions, absent strong conceptual and historical 41 grounding, run the serious risk of appearing as little more than 42 stipulation. The reader impatient with such analysis can skip to 43 Section 3. However, I think this would be a mistake. The approach I 44 have adopted is something I believe we need more in psychology; 45 too often we have a tendency to rely on terminology in place of 46 carefully specified, conceptually grounded analyses of constructs 47 of interest.
William James captures the relation of memory to the past with 126 characteristic clarity and concision: "A farther condition is required 127 before the present image can be held to stand for a past original. 128 That condition is the fact that the imagined be expressly referred 129 to the past, thought as in the past. . .But even that would not be 130 memory. Memory requires more than mere dating of a fact in the 131 past. It must be dated in my past. In other words, I must think that 132 I directly experienced its occurrence" (James, 1890, Vol. 1, p. 650; 133 emphasis in original).
134
One reason memory so often is associated with past-oriented 135 subjectivity is the failure to appreciate that although memory's 136 operations depend on past events, such dependence does not log-137 ically warrant the inference that memory, as experienced, is about 138 the past. A failure to separate the how of memory function from the 139 purpose of memory function has led to the common, but logically 140 indefensible, presumption that memory, being of the past, must, of 141 necessity, be about the past.
142
Thus, our truncated view of memory's temporality derives 143 largely from a failure to appreciate a subtle but crucial difference in 144 the use of two grammatically related prepositions -of and about. 145 While of implies "from" or "due to", about, in a functional sense, 146 implies "for" or "directed toward" (note: About can also be taken 147 to mean "concerning". This is not its functional sense, but rather 148 its referential sense. As we will see in a later section of this paper, 149 memory can refer to the past -e.g., episodic recollection -but this is 150 not its primary evolved function: It does not imply it is for the past). 151 As a result of this conflation, the exception is taken for the rule. 152 This linguistic faux pas is made apparent when questions designed 153 to probe memory's capabilities are complimented with questions 154 about its functionality. A consequence of assuming that memory necessarily is "about 158 the past" is that mental events lacking clear connection to past-159 oriented subjectivity historically have been treated as sub-species, 160 rather than full-fledged aspects of memory. Although most modern 161 taxonomies include these formerly problematic constituents (e.g., 162 semantic and procedural memory), this was not always the case 163 (note: In this paper I deal exclusively with long-term memory).
164
For example, the memorial status accorded to "knowledge" his-165 torically has been inconsistent. This was due in large part to the 166 absence of a pre-reflectively given connection between knowledge-167 as-experienced and past-oriented subjectivity (i.e., autonoesis; e.g., 168 Tulving, 1985, 2002; Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997) -a connec-169 tion mandated by memory defined as re-acquaintance with the 170 past. 2 To the extent that knowledge was included in treatments of 171 memory, the focus primarily was on the means by which learning 172 conditions enabled re-acquaintance with previously learned facts, 173 rather than the memorial status or function of those facts per se 174 (e.g., Danziger, 2008; Yates, 1966) .
175
Factual knowledge obviously can refer to the past -e.g., remem-176 bering the route to take to find the house I grew up in. However, 177 that knowledge is given to awareness as a "recipe" for locating the 178 house, not as a phenomenological reliving of the past (e.g., Klein, 179 2013a; Tulving, 1985) : Its pastness is inferred from its content 180 rather than pre-reflectively given to awareness (the latter -the 181 experience of reliving past events -is made possible by episodic 182 2 While knowledge obviously can be related to the past, this relation is unlike that found with episodic recollection. In the case of knowledge, relation to the past results either from inference (i.e., given what else I know, X must of transpired at time T, where T is prior to the present) or a from reflection on the content of an occurrent mental state (e.g., remembering one's favorite television show from the 1970s). By contrast, episodic recollection's relation to the past is pre-reflectively given (e.g., Klein, 2013a; Tulving, 1985) . gata certainly qualifies as an alteration in the neural tissue likely 236 to be correlated with mental and physical change (albeit disrup-237 tive rather than constructive). To be seen as memory, the changes This definition, I believe, is broad enough to accommodate the 242 interests of most modern memory researchers. It is sufficiently 243 open-ended to preclude premature exclusion of potential mem-244 ory phenomena, yet sufficiently specific to enable the construction 245 of well-formed (i.e., the "right") questions. In addition, it resonates 246 with the historically popular metaphor of memory as a process of 247 inscription -an idea that can be traced from Aristotle's etched-248 wax tablets (e.g., Sorabji, 1972) to computers (e.g., Norman, 1970) 249 to changes in neural matter detectable by modern radiology (for 250 review, see Draaisma, 2000).
251
Historical antecedents for this definition are easy to find. Com-252 pare Edridge-Green (1897), who on the first page of her text on 253 memory defines it as "the process by means of which the exter-254 nal world and ideas are retained for use on future occasions." (p. 255 1). Von Feinaigle (1813) expresses a similar view, describing mem-256 ory as "that faculty that enables us to treasure up, and preserve 257 for future use, the knowledge we acquire" (p. 1). Despite their age, 258 these views have surprising resonance with definitions that popu-259 late many modern texts (e.g., Crowder, 1976; Neath, 1998). 
Memory and subjective temporality

261
So what, if anything, is missing from a definition of memory that 262 is (a) widely held, (b) has a long academic pedigree and (c) has been 263 crafted to capture the concept in only the broadest brush strokes? 264 The answer is subtle but critical. What is missing is an explicit state-265 ment of the relation between memory and the mode of subjective 266 temporality it affords. Nor is such a statement found in most def-267 initions of memory (including the few mentioned above: Mention 268 of words such as "on future occasions" in the above definitions is 269 mute with respect to subjective temporal phenomenology; it rather 270 is a statement of the retentive properties of memory). The relation 271 between memory and the past is so intuitive that it often is taken 272 for granted. Why bother to state the obvious?
273
Memory, by any reasonable definition, is dependent on past 274 events. This, however, does not sanction the conclusion that mem-275 ory necessarily is about the past. Such an assumption -which 276 characterizes the majority of both ancient and modern views of 277 memory -trades on the logically unjustifiable conclusion that what 278 is of the past must therefore be about the past. Before tackling the 279 merit of this inference (in Sections 4 and 5), let's take a moment 280 to survey the relation between memory and temporality from an 281 historical perspective. The earliest known Western writing on the relation between 285 memory and time is from the 8th century BC. In his Theogony, Hes-286 iod contends that the ability to transcend objective time is made 287 possible by the faculty of human memory (e.g., Cassel, Cassel, & 288 Manning, 2013), thereby providing the first conception of memory 289 as a mechanism enabling mental time travel. While Hesiod concep-290 tualization was open to temporality in its fullness (i.e., past present 291 and future), Aristotle's (384 BC-322 BC) view was more restricted. 292 In De Memoria he repeatedly makes clear that the concern of mem-293 ory exclusively is with things past: The object of memory ". . .is the 294 past, not the future or present, nor what is present as an object of 295 perception or theorizing." (De Memoria, reprinted in Sorabji, 1972, 296 the first 100 places after the decimal point) or even detrimental (e.g., memories that give rise to post-traumatic stress) to an organism's survival. Accordingly, the products of memory need not promote survival; the only requirement is that they are underwritten by alterations in structures whose evolutionary origins trace to that purpose. 
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357
Yet every machine, in virtue of having a particular causal struc-358 ture, is capable of doing an endless series of things it was not 359 designed to do. As many children discover, if you shake a well-360 used three-hole punch, confetti comes out. The production of small 361 circles of paper is a by-product of the machine's design. None of 362 the parts exist because that arrangement makes confetti. Had the 363 machine been design to make confetti, one might expect more than 364 just three elements, that their shape would be more in keeping 365 with the festivities typically associated with the use of confetti (e.g., 366 star-like rather than round), etc. In short, confetti-making does not 367 explain the presence or arrangement of the punch's parts. Nor do 368 any of the punch's other capabilities -for example, its usefulness 369 as a paper weight. These capabilities are arbitrary with respect to 370 its intended function, by-products of the machine's design (e.g., 371 Barkow, Cosmides, & Tooby, 1992; Williams, 1966) .
372
The tradition of studying memory by seeing what it is capa-373 ble of doing -without asking what it was designed to do -is 374 like studying a three-hole punch as if it were a confetti-maker 375 or a paper weight. It is not an effective method for honing in on 376 the set of highly ordered, interlocking elements that embody the 377 systems functional design. An exclusive focus on capability tells 378 us what memory can do, but it does little to help us understand 379 what memory was designed to do. It is like studying the confetti 380 produced by a three-hole punch. Absent a focus on the aspects of 381 design directed by natural selection, we essentially end up study-382 ing the "confetti of memory" (although, as we will see in Section 4, 383 in the case of episodic memory properties that initially may have 384 been by-products can be co-opted by natural selection and acquire 385 functional relevance; e.g., Gould & Vrba, 1982 
398
The origins of vertebrate memory are hypothesized to date to 399 the Cambrian "explosion" (e.g., Ginsburg & Jablonka, 2007 . 400 This period, which spanned approximately 25 million years begin-401 ning around 545 million years ago, is considered one of the most 402 significant transitions in evolutionary history (e.g., Marshall, 2006;  The cause of the Cambrian "explosion" is subject to debate (e.g., 407 changes in the oxygenation or temperature of the biotic environ-408 ment; for discussion, see Marshall, 2006; Valentine, 2004) . One 409 suggestion is that the astonishing ecological and morphological 410 diversification found during the "explosion" stems from a genetic 411 reorganization of the central nervous system that occurred in par-412 allel among several groups of Cambrian metazoans (e.g., From an evolutionary perspective, the function of memory is to 503 aid the organism in anticipating events and deciding the actions 504 to take. These abilities require an orientation toward the future. 505 Life comes at organisms from the future, not from the past, and it 506 is in that direction that our efforts (accompanied by phenomenal 507 and/or access consciousness; e.g., Block, 1998) must be directed. 508 Even responses to present contingencies are necessarily oriented 509 toward the future (see footnote 2). So why is the subjective tem-510 porality of memory so often assumed to be oriented toward the 511 past?
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As I see it, three considerations help account for this tempo-513 ral misalignment. First, we often conflate the how of memory with 514 the why of memory (see Sections 2 and 3). That is, we assume 515 that the neural mechanisms that mediate memory performance 516 provide direct insight into memory's function. They do not. As 517 discussed in the previous section, we need to draw a sharp concep-518 tual distinction between how a function is instantiated and what 519 the function was designed to accomplish -knowledge of which 520 will help separate those features of the memory's design that are 521 relevant to its function from those that support performance of 522 things simply in virtue of the fact that every machine (whether 523 biological or artifactual) has a causal structure (i.e., by-products of 524 design).
525
Second, we are likely to be disproportionately influenced in our 526 assessment of memory's temporality by its most salient temporal 527 feature -recollective experience. Episodic memory's connection to 528 the past is given to consciousness in way that of procedural and 529 semantic memory are not -it is directly given (e.g., Klein, 2013a; 530 Tulving, 1985) . As a wealth of social psychological research has 531 shown, the most salient members of a set have the highest like-532 lihood of having their characteristics taken as properties of the 533 whole (for review see Schneider, 2004) . For this reason, orienta-534 tion toward the past, made possible by episodic memory, can be 535 expected to occupy a position of (inordinate) prominence in our 536 assessment of the memory's mode of temporality.
537
Third, we need to be mindful of the social origins of most of our 538 attitudes toward remembering (e.g., Nelson, 1989 Nelson, , 1993 Nelson, , 1996 ). An 539 abundance of evidence demonstrates that when parent (or care-540 giver) and child begin to talk about previously experienced events 541 (a process that begins almost as soon as the child learns to speak), 542 the parent provides the structure within which to frame the conver-543 sation (e.g., Farrant 
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ing and confirming what the parent has said (Haden, 2003 All memory experience is occurrent -it is a mental state hap-618 pening now. As Reid puts it, "Every man can distinguish the thing 619 remembered from the remembrance of it. We may remember any 620 thing we have seen, or heard, or known, of done, or suffered; but the 621 remembrance of it is a particular act of the mind which now exists, 622 and of which we are conscious" (Reid, 1813/1969, pp. 324-325). 623 We can take issue with Reid's insistence that every act of memory 624 is conscious (this makes sense if and only if memory is, at it typically 625 was, conflated with its episodic component); but every memory-626 based "act of the mind" certainly takes place in the present. To 627 identify a mental state as a memory, as opposed to, say, an act 628 of imagination, we therefore need to refer the occurrent state to 629 events from the past.
630
In the case of semantic and procedural memory, this is accom-631 plished via inference or interpretation. The case of episodic memory 632 is more complicated. Unlike semantic and procedural memory, the 633 pastness of episodic recollection is given directly to awareness (e.g., 634 Klein, 2013a absence of a way to determine whether non-verbal beings are capa-645 ble of autonoesis (i.e., the mental state in which the individual's 646 subjectivity is characterized by ". . .awareness of re-experiencing 647 here and now something that happened before, at another time 648 and in another place"; Tulving, 1993, p. 68), such abilities are most 649 judiciously characterized as "episodic-like" (for a recent review, see 650 Pause et al., 2013). Whether non-human animals eventually will 651 be shown to experience episodic recollection is presently indeter-652 minable.
653
Thus, episodic memory, due to its association with autonoetic 654 awareness (e.g., Tulving, 1985 Tulving, , 1993 Tulving, , 2005 ; Wheeler et al., 1997), 655 provides a direct, pre-reflectively given connection to past expe-656 rience (Klein, 2013a) . A person possessing autonoetic awareness 657 is capable of re-living experiences in their felt pastness. Episodic 658 memory is the only type of memory to be experientially wedded to 659 the past in a manner satisfying Aristotle's edict.
660
However, before concluding that episodic memory is unique in 661 its temporal orientation -facing backward rather than forward 662 -it is prudent to consider whether autonoetic awareness, which 663 enables experience of the past, evolved for that purpose. Evolu-664 tionary considerations suggest otherwise: "Re-experiencing the 665 past" may not have been the function memory was designed by 666 natural selection to accomplish; rather, this capability may bet-667 ter be viewed as a by-product of the functional design -albeit a 668 by-product that subsequently acquired adaptive importance and 669 underwent exaptation.
670
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This makes adaptive sense. Given that nature builds on exist- Klein, 764 in press). Another approach to memory that emphasizes its future-765 oriented aspects is that of memory in its prospective capacities (for 766 review, see Brandimonte, Einstein, & McDaniel, 1996). However, 767 despite espoused concern with memory in relation to the future, 768 both of these programs rely heavily on measures designed to assess 769 the retrospective properties of memory (e.g., differences in reten-770 tion associated with task manipulations) with almost no attention 771 given to the behavioral concomitants of adaptive functionality -772 e.g., how plans are constructed from memory; that is, how dif-773 ferent systems of memory, belief, expectations, imagination and 774 goals work together to anticipate and respond to survival needs, 775 etc.
776
That a focus on memory as "about the past" still is the norm is 777 put in sharp relief by Hoerl and McCormack's (2001) edited vol-778 ume "Time and Memory". Of approximately 400 pages only about 779 13 are devoted to consideration of the relation between memory 780 and future-oriented cognition. By contrast, more than half of the 781 chapters are specifically concerned with memory in relation to the 782 past (e.g., "Memory, Awareness and the Past" and "Knowledge and 783 the Past").
784
A slightly more recent volume on the same topic (Parker, 785 Crawford, & Harris, 2006) presents a somewhat more encourag-786 ing picture. Two of the 16 chapters are explicitly addressed to 787 the future-orientation of memory, while several others at least 788 mention the theme. Sill, a heavy dose of past-oriented temporal-789 ity remains on display (e.g., "inscribing and forgetting", "memory 790 traces", "retention", "remembering the past", etc.). Nonetheless, the 791 more visible role accorded future-oriented memory is, in my view, 792 a positive development.
793
One area does show considerable promise for an eventual 794 re-evaluation of memory's temporal priorities is research on 795 future-oriented mental time travel (FMTT). As noted earlier, this 796 is a topic of great interest to both cognitive psychologists and neu-797 roscientists, with more than 100 papers appearing the in just the 798 past 5 years! In contrast to the disconnection between orientation 799 that memory work as designed, not that it remain faithful to some bered is sufficient to get the job done (e.g., to anticipate or plan for 835 future contingencies), how it gets the job done is of considerably less 836 concern (at least to nature; scientists are likely to feel otherwise).
837
5 There clearly can be reasons to know what happened 10 min, 10 h, 10 days, 10 months or 10 years ago. But knowing when something happened does not require experiencing that knowledge as part of the past. This can occur -inferentially (in the case of semantic memory) and pre-reflectively (in the case of episodic memory). But the facts to which the knowledge refers do not have to be phenomenologically given as past. From a functional perspective, all they need is to be occurrently known as referring to the past. And even the act of "knowing remembered events are from the past" often is not necessary for achieving one's goal. For example, I can retrace my steps in memory to recover my lost keys. But to accomplish my objective (key recovery), the knowledge occupying awareness need not be experientially placed in the past or even inferentially referred to the past. It simply needs to provide an atemporal schema or recipe I can use to guide my search for the lost key. I can reconstruct my acts of the past as being in the past, but this serves no adaptive purpose beyond locating the reconstruction in its proper temporal context (i.e., the keys I lost today, not yesterday or the day before). 6 Questions of "truth" must, of logical necessity, be restricted to the declarative systems of memory. Procedural memory, lacking propositional representation, is formally precluded from considerations truth.
7 To assess the degree to which an object of experience recaptures the original object as experienced, we need to compare the two. But to do so requires we already have access to the past object or event. If the object of comparison exists in the mind, a memorial representation appears to be superfluous (e.g., Locke, 1971) . If, instead, a physical record of the original object or event exists, a non-redundant comparison can be made. However, to determine whether the physical record is the correct object of comparison requires we remember its past status (e.g., is this the relevant written record, is this the intended photograph?). Identifying the physical object of comparison thus depends on memory, thereby begging the question: i.e., assuming what one it trying to prove.
On this view, there is no principled reason for memory to adhere 838 to any particular degree of faithfulness to the past; all that mat-839 ters, from a functional perspective, is that the information memory 840 supplies is beneficial to the adaptive demands placed on the organ-841 ism. Indeed, recent treatments of "false memory" have begun to 842 attribute many distortions to the operation of adaptive processes, 843 rather than to some flaw inherent in the system (for recent review 844 see Schacter, Guerin, & St. Jacques, 2011).
845
This is not to say that memory content is unconstrained. To effec-846 tively and reliably solve problems, memory must maintain some 847 degree of fidelity to the past. It would do no good to recollect a blue 848 elephant with angel's wings if a person was relying on memory 849 to locate a parked car. Nonetheless, within fairly wide parameters, 850 the content served up to consciousness need not entail "precision 851 of match" as a criterion of success.
852
That memory is a system for solving problems (e.g., Klein, 853 Cosmides, et al., 2002), rather than reproducing past with fidelity, 854 is clearly reflected in the conception of memory as re-constructive 855 rather than re-productive -an idea pioneered the work by Bartlett 856 (1932) and now taken as axiomatic. The notion that memory 857 does not consists in uniquely specifiable, self-contained traces, but 858 rather is a creative effort involving acts of expectation, imagina-859 tion, belief and other cognitive abilities also is seen in research 860 showing that recollection consists in a variety of functionally inde-861 pendent sub-systems that contribute the "who", "what", "where" 862 and "when" to the "unified" product given to consciousness (e.g., 863 Klein Viewing memory as related to, and perhaps inseparable from, 866 acts of imagination, thought, etc., also helps explain traditional dif-867 ficulties encountered when one attempts to provide a set of norms 868 by which to differentiate memory from other cognitive functions. 869 For example, over the years numerous criteria have been proposed 870 for differentiating memory from non-memorial mental content. 871 Hume argued that the vivacity of a mental image is a basis by 872 which we separate an image or thought from a memory, with mem-873 ory being more lively and vivacious (Hume, 1748 (Hume, /2004 . Russell 874 saw things differently, arguing that to be considered memory a 875 mental content must be accompanied by two feelings -pastness 876 and familiarity (e.g., Russell, 1921). Among modern psychologi-877 cal investigators, the work of Johnson and colleagues represents 878 the most systematic attempt to tackle this vexing problem (for a 879 review see Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993) . Their research 880 eventuated in a set of criteria for identifying a mental experience 881 as a memory -e.g., the richness of the contextual and perceptual 882 elements contained in a mental state.
883
Unfortunately, as most theorists and practitioners have dis-884 covered, none of these criteria stand the test of logical analysis 885 or introspection (for reviews, see Bernecker, 2010; Casey, 1977; 886 Furlong, 1951; Warnock, 1987) . For example, Russell's assumption 887 that the content of memory experience is "bound to the past" is 888 undermined by demonstrations that memorial experience is, at 889 least to a degree, reconstructive (e.g., Bartlett, 1932) . And, we all 890 have had experiences in which an imagination is vivid and a mem-891 ory faint. As Bernecker (2010) concludes, the problem with the 892 memory-markers thus far proposed is that "they don't offer a reli-893 able mark" (p. 22). However, this need not concern us if memory is 894 construed as a functionally related, interacting set of cognitive abil-895 ities rather than a fixed inscription in neural matter (e.g., De Brigard, 896 2013; Klein et al., 2004; Schacter, 2012) . Memory and imagination 897 may be so difficult to disentangle because there is no clear concep-898 tual (e.g., Klein, 2013b; Schacter, 2012) or neurological (Mullally & 899 Maguire, in press) line of demarcation.
900
This brings me to the topic of considerable contemporary 901 interest -memory and neuro-imaging. While space requirements 902 placed on Target Articles prevent extended discussion, suffice it 903 the "mistake" of assuming that just because researchers "assess 
965
This is not to say that such considerations are uninformative; 966 they are helpful -to a degree. But, if one wants to understand the 967 features of a system put in place by natural selection, one needs 968 to focus on those aspects of the system that map its functional-969 ity -i.e., the adaptive task(s) for which it was selected (as noted, 970 this is starting to occur -e.g., Schacter et al., 2011 ). Once we more 971 fully appreciates the extent to which memory is oriented toward 972 the "now and the next", measures such as the fidelity take a sec-973 ond seat to measures that address future-directed functionality. We 974 see this in the recent work on future-oriented mental time travel, 975 where participants are asked to do such things as construct sce-976 narios illustrating their plans and anticipations. Neither amount 977 remembered (in the process of construction) nor the veracity of the 978 content retrieved is an essential consideration: What is of interest 979 is how these constructions enable their constructor to better con-980 ceptualize and deal with what he or she believes is likely to be 981 encountered.
982
The traditional memory research context -in which measures 983 of retention serve as the dependent measure -also needs to take 984 into consideration the goal-oriented, social nature of the testing 985 situation. From the investigator's point of view, the participant is 986 presented with a list of words, or whatever, and then, after the pas-987 sage of some interval, asked to reproduce or recognize the items 988 presented. But, from the participant's perspective, the testing con-989 text is an ongoing social interaction with a clear goal -she or he 990 is being asked engage in future-oriented behavior (e.g., the act of 991 recollection) to satisfy the social contract into which he or she has 992 entered. Veracity/amount of output is one consideration, but an 993 analysis of the participant's perceived goals, methods of achieving 994 those goals, assessing their level of attainment, and the effects on 995 social status that result from entering into the social contract we 996 call the "experimental situation" (all having to do with the future) 997 need greater consideration and empirical attention. Memory can-998 not be divorced from its functional context.
999
Memory often is described as complex (e.g., Foster & Jelicic, 1000 1999). It is, but not necessarily for the reasons typically given 1001 (e.g., multiple stages and systems). It is complex because it is an 1002 organismic function wedded to expectation, planning, anticipation, 1003 prediction, contingency management, navigating social interac-1004 tions, self-definition, imagination, creativity, goals, beliefs, actions, 1005 etc.; in short, it is concerned with understanding "what is, and what 1006 to do about it" (e.g., Klein, 2007) . It is a response to environmental 1007 contingencies and internal states by which the organism positions 1008 itself to deal with consequences (real or imagined) placed in its 1009 path.
1010
Until we take this aspect of complexity into account in our 1011 experimental analyses, we will have taken only a small step from 1012 that which we proudly proclaim "modern memory research" has 1013 successfully distanced itself -i.e., the Ebbinghaus tradition. Cer-1014 tainly some separation has been achieved: We now acknowledge 1015 factors such as meaning and reconstruction. However, we still 1016 focus largely on measures of retention, while ignoring the future-1017 oriented, often goal-based, functions that situates memory in its 1018 evolved context.
1019
New measures and methods that address these adaptive con-1020 cerns are needed. While the details mostly remain to be worked 1021 out, knowing what needs to be addressed provides the direction 1022 needed to formulate the "right" questions. The future-oriented 1023 mental time travel literature provides some suggestions (e.g., sce-1024 nario construction, schema-based planning), but other measures 1025 tapping participants' goals, beliefs, construals, anticipations, solu-1026 tions (mental and physical), etc. must be addressed. 8 1027 child does not remember where and how she touched the hot stove 1086 in the past, but she knows how to treat the stove now; the amnesic 1087 patient does not remember that the examining physician hid a pin 1088 in his hand while shaking the patient's hand an hour ago, but she 1089 knows that it is not good to shake the doctor's hand now; the con-1090 testant in a TV show does not remember when or where or how she 1091 acquired the knowledge that Hannibal is associated with elephants, 1092 but she answers the question correctly and profitably now. Because 1093 all these people can efficiently rely on their proscopic memory, 1094 remembering the past is irrelevant.
1095
Thus, despite the traditional association between memory and 1096 the past, the remembering of the past, in the sense of conscious 1097 recollection of what happened on an earlier occasion, does not 1098 play any critical role in making use of what has been learned 1099 and the fruits of that learning are used. Sometimes, of course, the 1100 expression of acquired skills and knowledge is accompanied by 1101 conscious recollections of past experiences, but these occurrences 1102 are epiphenomenal only. The circumstances surrounding the origin 1103 and creation of knowledge that guides effective behavior may be of 1104 interest to the scientist studying such behavior, but to the behaving 1105 organism it makes no difference.
1106
The singular exception to all the ubiquity and evolutionary sig-1107 nificance of proscopic forms of learning and memory that serve 1108 the future without bothering about the past is episodic memory. 1109 Episodic memory does exactly what other forms of memory do not 1110 and cannot do -it makes it possible for the individual to recollect 1111 previously experienced events as such. It enables the individual to 1112 mentally 'travel back into her personal past.' It shares with pro-1113 scopic memory the basic function -it provides the individual with 1114 useful information as to the effective courses of actions in various 1115 situations-but it goes beyond the proscopic function in that it does 1116 allow us to remember (to consciously recollect) what happened 1117 in the past. A child remembers what happened at a friend's birth-1118 day party the day before, a young lover remembers the expression 1119 on the beloved's face in the moonlight, the scientist remembers 1120 the first time when a speaker at a conference mentioned her name 1121 and work, and so on, and on. Because episodic memory is oriented 1122 toward the past, we can think of episodic memory as 'palinscopic' 1123 (backward-looking) memory. An individual who 'possesses' palin-1124 scopic memory can at Time 2 'mentally travel back' to Time 1." (a 1125 fuller treatment can be found in Tulving, 2005) . 10
1126
Tulving's insights express with his unique clarity and concision 1127 much of what I have struggled to communicate in this paper: Mem-1128 ory -with the (possible) exception of episodic recollection -is of 1129 the past (acquisition), in the present (experience) and about the 1130 future (temporal orientation). 
